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Car number plates rarely make national headlines. But in July 2015, a vehicle bearing a Saudi license plate was spotted in the port of Jaffa prompting not inconsiderable discussion on social media across Israel and making the front page of several national newspapers the next day. The owner of the car was indeed a Saudi who had crossed into Israel via Jordan to discuss a business venture with an Israeli Arab but irrespective of the commercial justification, it was the wider political symbolism of this sighting that carried most weight. As one Israeli journalist noted, "The nuclear agreement with Iran is starting to prove itself."
("Car with Saudi license plates," 2015)
For Riyadh and other Gulf states, the nuclear deal struck between Tehran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany (P5+1) in July 2015 may have served the interests of the Western powers, but it has done little to curb Iran's regional interests or indeed its longer term nuclear ambitions (Guzansky, 2015, p. 129; "Israel and the Arab world," 2016) . This view remains widely held in Israel too. Although some within the country's military and security establishment welcomed the agreement, from 2009 onwards successive centre right governments, led by Premier Binyamin Netanyahu, voiced their trenchant opposition to any deal that would allow Iran to increase financial aid to its regional proxies while maintaining a breakout capability within its nuclear program, albeit one diminished by the terms of the agreement (Jones, 2016) .
It also highlighted a wider issue for both Israel and Saudi Arabia: The extent to which Washington, DC appears unwilling or unable to exercise strategic leadership across the region, a leadership on which both Israel and the Gulf states had based their regional security strategies (Simon & Stevenson, 2015, pp.2-10 ). This in turn poses a profound question:
How can we conceptualize the scope and intensity of relations between Israel and the Arab Gulf states that have emerged since 2009? This article puts forward the argument that at the very least, such relations are now more pronounced and vibrant than hitherto realized: they have now evolved into what we define as a "tacit security regime" (TSR) which, while based on hard power interests, does not preclude competition or co-operation in other areas between the actors involved.
The very idea of what constitutes a TSR remains contested; geo-strategic interests as well as ideational factors determine the intimacy or otherwise of relations between the actors involved. Even so, a consensus is clearly discernible around how adversaries -who would otherwise normally eschew more formal means of diplomatic exchange -manage their relations through a series of informal agreements and understandings and where, despite being unwritten and not codified, rules and boundaries in pursuit of wider shared interests or readily understood. Equally, such regimes do not have to privilege normative principles usually associated with international regime theories much beyond the maintenance of national security to be effective. To this end, the TSR between Israel and the Gulf states is very much a "work in progress," its resilience in meeting contemporary security challenges being a function of shared perceptions of the threat presented by Iran, rather than a clandestine expression of a deeper intimacy beyond strategic gain.
The first part of this article offers an overview of security regimes more generally before outlining the genesis of the TSR in the extant literature. Building on this literature, we posit an analytical framework that while emphasizing the primacy of Realpolitik in the emergence of such regimes, appreciates how ideational concerns determine the scope and trajectory of Israel's ties with the Gulf states. The second part offers contextual background on the emergence of the TSR; the third offers a more detailed application of the framework by examining Israel's ties with several Gulf states but with a particular emphasis upon Saudi Arabia. Finally, we conclude by examining the wider significance of the TSR as a recognition and reflection of Washington's regional retrenchment. More broadly, our conception of the TSR has an undoubted utility beyond the Middle East. It can inform and illuminate patterns of state behavior between erstwhile protagonists in other parts of the world facing security challenges that have, hitherto, been arbitrated through the diplomatic and military influence of the United States.
From Security Regimes to TSRs
Unlike liberal institutional approaches that regard international regimes as largely collaborative mechanisms between allies designed to mitigate the worst excesses of the security dilemma while producing a normative public good, security regimes, with their emphasis upon hard power, are underpinned by shared perceptions of threats to be countered and interests to be realized. As that doyen of regime theory, Stephen Krasner, would most likely recognize, security regimes of this type remain the progeny of the classic security dilemma. (Krasner, 1983; Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997, pp. 8-22.) Yet much of the literature surrounding the establishment of security regimes still emphasizes the formal rules to be adhered to, often within an agreed institutional setting that eventually gives rise to formal alliances. In his examination of the Concert of Europe that broadly secured European peace for almost a century following the Napoleonic wars, Robert Jervis highlighted the shared understandings and the desire to maintain the status quo among the great European powers. His typology embraced (1) a mutual recognition of vital interests; (2) a propensity for longer term strategic gain brought about by restraint over immediate advantage; (3) that the actual concert did not conform to the actual distribution of power capabilities but rather conformed to agreed principles governing state behavior.
From this, Jervis concluded that security regimes were configured around principles, rules and norms that engendered mutual reciprocity and restraint (Jervis, 1985, pp. 58-79) .
At first glance, identifying any security regime in the Middle East demonstrating adherence to any of the three characteristics outlined by Jervis is not easy. Despite its relative longevity, the GCC has hardly conformed to agreed principles governing security cooperation. Most notably, the attempt in 1991 to establish a peninsula force designed to deter any future Iraqi aggression -the so-called Damascus Declaration -proved stillborn:
Suspicion of Saudi dominance, coupled with fears that the presence of Syrian and Egyptian forces as part of the force could prove destabilizing to the monarchies of the Gulf were enough to scupper the initiative. But more nuanced understandings of security regimes and how they might operate within the context of the Middle East have been developed elsewhere.
Three decades ago and building on the work of Jervis, Stein (1985) looked to apply the concept of a security regime to understanding the broad contours of the Arab-Israeli conflict. She claimed that zero-sum competition no-longer defined this conflict; rather, the interests of Israel and its Arab neighbors were neither "wholly competitive or compatible," leading to a process of conflict management where all sides recognized the rules of a game and the underlying principle of reciprocity involved. For Inbar and Sandler (1995, pp. 43-45) however, reciprocity alone was insufficient to account for the relative stability of ties between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Stein, they argued, underestimated the role that deterrence played in the relationship and in particular, through its exercise of overwhelming military power, the extent to which Israel saw its regional-strategic position and interests as configured around maintaining this status quo. This led them to argue that Israel's relations with the wider Arab world were best defined as a laissez faire security regime: order was maintained through the distribution of military power which privileged Israel and the emergence of a decentralized deterrence relationship. This ensured the acceptance, however reluctant, by other actors of the clear limitations of using force to change the regional configuration of power. Finally, Inbar and Sandler (1995, pp. 43-45) concluded that such laissez faire regimes lack the institutionalization and formal concordance that defined the construct of security regimes as defined by Jervis; even so, they are no less real for that.
The characterization of security regimes as laissez faire is, however, problematic.
The primacy placed on deterrence as the dominant condition of the regime tells as very little about the level and type of interaction between the actors involved. If the laissez faire regime is defined by a search for security from one another rather than with one another, it remains limited concerning other types and forms of interaction, notably co-operative behavior, that underpins constructs of a security regime. While accepting that rules can be informal and norms implied, they remain integral to a regime even if deterrence remains the bedrock of state interaction. Moreover, by emphasizing the idea of the status quo, how regional security regimes change and adapt remains unclear, not least when laissez faire regimes built on the basis of deterrence are faced by broader existential threats.
The need therefore to understand the actual interaction between erstwhile protagonists is crucial to embedding our understanding of a security regime as more than just a progeny of deterrence. The work of Klieman (1995) in relation to Israel's ties with Jordan prior to the signing of the peace treaty in 1994 offers a more appropriate conceptual point of departure.
Acknowledging, like Inbar and Sandler, that the study of international regimes often eschews "the traditionally normative, legalistic-formulistic and institutional focus on treaty alliances, the United Nations and multilateral organisations," Klieman (1995) placed the emphasis upon those areas of co-operation where "actor expectations converge" (p.127).
Taking this as his point of departure, Klieman went on to develop the idea of a "tacit" international security regime, a paradigm he described as "non-superpower, non-hegemonic, non-Western, non-contractual and non-institutionalised cooperation." (Klieman, 1995, p. 129) [T]he Israel-Jordan regime, although not entirely "unspoken or wordless," does arise and operate without any "express contract". (Klieman, 1995, p.130) While the maintenance of national security understood in its hierarchical sense remains the prime goal of such a regime, it is not the only "good" to be realized from the regime; neither, importantly, does it preclude continued competition in a different realm, be it political or economic (Klieman, 1995, p. 130) . There are however important caveats to be noted: Klieman's TSR was configured around a bi-lateral relationship rather than multilateral ties with a range of actors. Does the model therefore capture the complexity of the various interactions among and between Israel and the Gulf states? Secondly, the type of regime that emerged between Israel and Jordan was aided by a shared land border which enabled other "goods" to be realized beyond mitigating the mutual concerns regarding Palestinian nationalism. To what extent therefore is the durability of the regime a function of geographical proximity? Thirdly, can a TSR, particularly in a globalized age, have enduring appeal if it remains configured around the maintenance primarily of one "good," that is the containment of Iran, rather than a more nuanced understanding of wider security concerns that could range from environmental degradation through to energy security?
We note that that the contours of such a regime are certainly apparent in at least some facets of relations between Israel and the Gulf states but with one important innovation:
While the idea of the "unwritten" and the "uncodified" defined the clandestine nature of Klieman's TSR, the construct of the TSR between Israel and the Gulf states allows for multiple modes of engagement -some of it open -between the actors involved. As such, our construct of the TSR as it applies to Israel and the Gulf states is defined by the following:
That geographical proximity need not determine the scope and varying intensity of the modes and means of exchange -be they strategic, political, or economic -between the actors involved. That the regime itself is a function of shared perception of threat -in this case Iran -rather than primarily geared towards managing relations as Inbar and Sandler (1995) Washington experiencing its own difficulties with Iranian backed Shi'a militias in Iraq, there is a sense that the Israeli was playing to the gallery. Even so, Hadas-Handelsman warned that a pervasive feeling among the Gulf capitals was that the United States appeared no longer able or willing to extend effective security guarantees to the Gulf states and as such, friendly ties with Tehran were not a choice but a necessity. Quoting an unnamed Gulf official in close contact with Jerusalem, the Israeli diplomat went on to note that, "Our target [Iran] is mutual but we beg to differ on how to achieve it [countering its military power]." (Wikileaks, 2007) Having become pre-occupied with fighting two bloody military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the perception -if not the reality -that the United States was becoming increasingly wary (as well as weary) of further military commitments across the Middle East appeared pervasive among the Gulf states. These perceptions in turn had begun to influence attitudes towards both Iran and Israel even before the onset of the Arab spring.
Jerusalem was never to naïve enough to ascribe unity of purpose to the position of the Gulf states; Oman and Qatar in particular remained outliers in their public endorsement of close ties with Tehran. But behind closed doors, the Qataris were apparently convinced that only the threat of military action could curtail Tehran's regional ambition and nuclear program, the scope and scale of which Iran had only revealed under much duress from the international community (Eiran, 2015, p.63) . Now, fear of unchecked Iranian intrigue emboldened by a nuclear program designed to underpin those self-same goals increased concern that Washington, DC now looked to lessen its commitment to the security of the Gulf. From 2009 onwards Israel's relations with individual member states of the GCC emerged increasingly from the shadows and with it, the contours of a TSR whose realm was not contingent on geographical proximity or crucially, the development of normative principles designed to regulate the behavior of the actors involved.
The Contours of the Tacit Security Regime
The dominant variable that has pushed the Gulf states and Israel towards a TSR was a shared perception of Iran's growing regional power and, as our framework notes, the primary importance of protecting one "good" -national security -above all else. Ideational constraints remain important but the contours of the TSR that now emerged demonstrated how "unwritten and uncodified" rules begun to shape the interactions of the actors involved.
These relations were extensive, sometimes hidden but occasionally subjected to a wider regional gaze. [T]he Gulf Arabs believe in Israel's role because of the perception of Israel's close relationship with the U.S but also due to their sense that they can count on Israel against Iran. They believe Israel can work magic….When considering a tri-lateral U.S-Israel-GCC partnership, Hadas[Handelman] suggested we bear in mind that Iran's nuclear programme is the primary source of concern to the U.S and Israel, while the Gulf Arabs also worry about Iran for a host of historic and sectarian reasons (Wikileaks, 2009 ).
The Israeli diplomat conceded that progress on the Palestinian track would help ease a more public engagement with the Jewish state across the Gulf but Hadas-Handelman pushed the line that progress, while desirable, " [s] hould not be the sum total of Israel's relations with the Arab world" upon which everything else was contingent. Israel was therefore content for relations to remain at least partially veiled because the price to be paid for the security benefits to be gained could be purchased for very little domestic political cost: in short, pressure to compromise with the Palestinians and the inevitable backlash from right wing and religious-nationalists this would inevitably draw was largely removed from the diplomatic equation (Inbari, 2012, pp.130-150) . Instead, Israel could in practice compartmentalize its relations with particular Gulf states precisely because, as HadasHandelman noted, the shared fears over Iranian regional designs created a hierarchy of values within the TSR that trumped any immediate desire among the Gulf states to push the Arab peace initiative.
The gains Israel accrued in the capitals of the Arab Gulf however were seemingly put at risk for short term tactical gain when, in the spring of 2010, Israeli intelligence officers were believed to have carried out the assassination of the Hamas security chief, Mahmoud alMabhouh, in a Dubai hotel (Raviv & Melman, 2012, pp.302-308) . But while the killing was met with almost ritual condemnation across the region and indeed much of Europe, such reaction was almost choreographed for domestic consumption. In as much as there can be diplomatic fall-out between states who have no official ties, it was surprisingly short-lived.
This validates a defining elements of the TSR: A recognition and acceptance that while it does not inhibit actors towards a particular type of action, the regime does mitigate friction resulting from such acts. Furthermore, it allows cooperation in other realms to develop and continue.
One such realm is the Middle East Desalination Research Centre (MEDRC) based in
Muscat. An organization that has set out to realize an epistemic community dedicated to addressing water scarcity across the Middle East, the MEDRC was established in 1996 as a (Gal, 2012) . Notable in this regard has been Israeli involvement in the sale of the "'Falcon Eye" surveillance system as well as advanced cyber -security software purchased from Israel by the Emiratis in 2015 (Shezaf & Donaghy, 2016; Bergman, 2016) .
The comparative advantage Israel enjoys in the fields of security and intelligence is one that has a clear appeal for some of the dynastic monarchies who, while acknowledging the need for domestic reform, remained keen to mitigate any wider undercurrents of internal social unrest. Even before the Arab uprisings, Israel had developed links with Bahrain through the Mossad. Such were the intimacy of such contacts that the Bahraini monarch, Hamad ibn Isa al-Khalifa instructed officials in Manama to refrain from reference to the "Zionist entity" or the "enemy," derogatory nomenclature used to refer to Israel more widely across the Arab world (Melman, 2011; Wasser, 2013) .
Evidence too exists that this wider acceptance (though not embrace of Jews and Israel) has a wider traction across the region. As the eighth annual Arab Youth Survey highlighted most clearly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is ranked only seventh when young Arabs were asked to identify the biggest challenges now facing the Middle East with Israel only eliciting a mention by name on just two occasions (Arab Youth Survey, 2016) . At the very least, such sentiment portends wider Gulf Arab acceptance of elite dialogue, an important variable as noted in our framework in legitimizing a more substantive exchange of both political and strategic goods between the regime actors. As important as such ties and indeed sentiments are to Jerusalem however, their level and intensity is ultimately contingent on the position of Saudi Arabia and the extent to which Riyadh has been willing to confront its own Wahhabi religious establishment -which has long regarded Israel as an apostasy -in its effort to construct a broader front against Tehran.
Israel and Saudi Arabia
As the key actors in the evolution of the TSR, both Israel and Saudi Arabia have embraced not just the "unwritten" and "uncodified" of Klieman's definition, but increasingly the more open if subtle signals between key actors whose importance is more than just the symbolism of the act: rather, as noted in our framework, the regime has Initiative. The importance of the event was in its political symbolism as it was streamed live to a global audience, breaking a long held taboo that any Saudi, let alone one identified so closely with the ruling family, could ever appear in public with their erstwhile foe. While Prince Turki continued to champion the Arab Peace Initiative and with it, tangible progress to be made on issues related to refugees, borders and the status of Jerusalem, his appearance was actually of a piece with a discernible if low-key Saudi 'intellectual' engagement with Israel that eschewed the crude stereotype and epithets of previous years. For example, another senior member of the ruling dynasty, Brigadier-General Naef Bin Ahmed al-Saud, published a detailed appreciation of the challenges -social, political and security relatednow facing the Jewish State. Of particular note in his essay was its thinly veiled support for Israel's response to pro-Palestinian activists trying to break the siege of the Gaza. Drawing parallels with the decision of Riyadh to offer military support to the Al-Khalifa regime in Bahrain, al-Saud noted that, "When foreigners aim to influence events under a particular nation's control, whether by social media or otherwise, that nation may take it upon itself to expel or repel such foreigners." (Ahmed al-Saud, 2012; Oren, 2012) For the Saudis, the events that led to their intervention in Bahrain were less an expression of the majority Shi'ite population demanding greater political and social rights, (Friedman, 2015) . At the end of 2015, the most senior cleric in the Kingdom, Shaykh Abdulaziz al-Shaykh even stated that the so called "Islamic state" was in reality an adjunct of the Israeli army. While clearly removed from any meaningful reality, such statements are indicative that the scope and intensity of even a tacit relationship has finite boundaries (Riedel, 2015 ; "Saudi Arabia denies," 2014).
The broader question however is that having failed to scupper the Iran deal in Congress, has this convinced the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia included, that Israel's influence in Washington, DC is less than its supposed many parts? The answer for now can be given in the negative, not least because both Israel and the Gulf states continue to share a malign view of Iranian influence throughout the region that remains at the evolutionary core of the TSR.
For example, Israeli coverage of the war in Yemen invariably ascribes the success of the Houthi tribal militias to the support of Tehran and has evinced little criticism over the conduct of the Saudi led air campaign that has yet to achieve any real tangible military or political gains for its ousted surrogate, President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi (Ziv, 2015; Bergman & Stark, 2015; Friedman, 2016b) . Equally, the reluctance of the Obama Administration to offer more forthright leadership across the region helped nurture and sustain a mutual acceptance "towards particular types of action" as part of the evolving nature of TSR. This suggests that in light of Washington, DC's apparent retrenchment, the symbiotic nature of the TSR, not least in the field of public and "soft" diplomacy outlined will likely endure. The evidence for this, both tangible and inferred, is persuasive.
In December 2015, the former Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Dore Gold, disclosed to the Saudi news website Elaph, at the end of 2015 that Israel had prevented SA-22 anti-aircraft missiles reaching the hand of Hezbollah, and concluded his interview by noting that
We [Israel and the Gulf States] have common interests regarding the Iranian threat, not only Tehran's nuclear programme, but also Iran's activities on the ground, and its repeated attempts to use the Shiite sect in the Arab world, to make them a fifth column among those states. (Kas, 2015) Gold had already made headlines that summer when, on the eve of assuming his appointment he had shared the stage with former Saudi General Anwar Eshki in an event organized under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. The Saudi remained keen to promote the API as the basis of a wider regional agreement as part of the discussions; most notable however, was the very public accord reached by both men that Iran remained the root cause of instability across much of the Middle East and a threat to their respective interests ("In a very rare public meet," 2015).
With the threat of social unrest across the Arab street still a source of deep concern for Riyadh, measures have been taken to alleviate the economic distress that underpins such popular resentment while enhancing security co-operation. In the case of Egypt, this included the announcement that Saudi Arabia would construct a bridge linking the Saudi mainland with the Sinai peninsula, a deal which saw sovereign control of the tiny islands of Tiran and Sanifir pass over to Riyadh. In 1967, Israeli sensitivities over access to the Red Sea through the Straits of Tiran presaged the Six Day War. Evidence exists however that Cairo notified Jerusalem of its intent to relinquish control of the islands, a conversation likely to have been coordinated with Riyadh. The Saudi Foreign Minister, Adel al-Jubeir, was quick to insist that the deal was struck "'without having a relationship or communication with Israel,"; but the strategic sensitivities involved could hardly have seen an agreement reached without (our emphasis) Israeli diplomatic benediction being conferred, however discreet, upon the deal (Al-Din, 2016; Cohen, 2016; Barel, 2016) . It is perhaps the most tangible manifestation to Such steps are of course unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future. In public at least, Saudi officials continue to make clear that until or unless Israel is willing to engage seriously with the API and with it, tangible progress towards realizing Palestinian selfdetermination, overt ties with Jerusalem will hardly move beyond the symbolic handshakes at academic symposia (Ravid, 2016c) . Netanyahu too remains hamstrung, politically as well as ideologically by a domestic constituency unwilling to accept substantive territorial concessions to the Palestinians; over Syria too, Israel and Saudi Arabia hold divergent views. (Inbari 2012) The shared animus towards Hizbollah apart , it is not at all clear that Israel wishes to see the removal of al-Asad (or at least his wider regime), a position at odds with the support given by Saudi Arabia to a plethora of armed Sunni groups.
It is a reality that is understood well by both Saudis and Israelis and accepted as such in the wider context of the shared antipathies towards Tehran but does not preclude, as part of the TSR, competition or divergent interests in other fields. Israel for example, voiced its objection to the sale by Washington, DC of advanced weapons systems to the Gulf states in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal, Jerusalem fearing that such sales threatened its qualitative military edge over its neighbors (Ravid, 2016d) . For all concerned, the nascent character of the TSR between Israel and the Gulf states has been shaped by its lowest common denominator, the perceived threat from Tehran, while sidestepping perhaps the more intractable issue of Palestinian statehood (Maddy-Weitzmann, 2016) . Other areas of cooperation and collaboration do of course exist, the MEDRC being the most notable example.
Still, whether overtime the contours of a TSR can foster the confidence building measures that will be required to reach a formal diplomatic treaty satisfactory to all sides will, in truth, be the real test of its leverage beyond the immediate purchase of hard security. For now, all concerned remain the best of adversaries.
Conclusion
The logic of the security dilemma would suggest that at the very least, a formal alliance between Israel and the Gulf states, conditioned by a shared view of Iranian regional intrigue would most likely emerge. That it has failed to do so speaks volumes for the continued hold that the divisive issue of Palestine continues to exercise over the collective Arab conscience as well as internal Israeli political discourse (Al-Faisal & Amidror, 2016) .
For now however Israeli policy makers believe that the loose institutional framework of the TSR has allowed the individual members to calibrate the level and intensity of ties with Jerusalem, an arrangement favored by Israel but with a recognition that Riyadh holds the whip hand. It may also reflect a continuity of Jerusalem's attitude toward peace in which it has demonstrated a continued preference for conducting bilateral negotiations. Still, improved relations and the benefits that may accrue from such ties remain contingent upon inter-Arab relations, internal GCC politics and progress being made in the Israeli-Palestinians negotiations (Levy & Eichner, 2016; Ravid, 2016e) . When coupled with the widely held perception that Washington, DC's military and diplomatic leverage across the region is much Our six defining elements of the TSR that have emerged between Israel and the Gulf states span a range of activities but recognize ultimately that hard security determines the level of engagement. It recognizes too that internal constraints on all sides determine the type and intensity of external engagement, a conceptual observation that challenges a purely realist account of regional power politics devoid of ideational content: There is also a realization that amid the upheaval and fragmentation of much of the Middle East, state based interests still matter and the interests of Jerusalem and Riyadh in this instance perhaps matter the most. Geographical proximity has never been an issue and nor has the multilateral nature of ties between Israel and the Gulf states, precisely because Riyadh's dominance of Gulf security has largely filtered the level of engagement with Israel.
For now, the level and intensity of the ties established relate primarily to Iran; but if the view holds that Washington, DC's diplomatic and military footprint among erstwhile protagonists faced with a wider regional challenge has become increasingly feint, the TSR emerging between Israel and the Gulf states might well provide a template for understanding shifts in alliance patterns across the wider region. Such patterns of engagement are already discernible in Israel's ties with Russia as both parties seek to avoid misunderstandings over Lebanon and Syria while pursuing national security objectives clearly at variance (Barel, 2017) . At a time when state sovereignty and legitimacy are increasingly framed by sectarian identities and religious affiliation, the very idea of the TSR or variants thereof will now likely define the modes and means of diplomatic exchange across the Middle East as the regions states continue to chase its most precious yet elusive of prizes: security itself.
